


PN-ACA-995

No. HNE-5832-I-00-4016-00

Delivery Order No. 15



Preventing and Mitigating

Violent Conflicts:

**An Abridged
Practitioners' Guide**

Prepared for:

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative

**The United States Department of State
and
The United States Agency
for
International Development**

April 1997

This document, *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: An Abridged Practitioners' Guide*, is a condensed version of a companion volume entitled *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners*, initially published in March 1996 and updated in April 1997.

Both of these documents were prepared by Creative Associates International, Inc. at the request of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative to help support the Initiative's efforts to promote peace and development in the Greater Horn of Africa. These documents are unclassified and did not rely on any classified documents or reports.

The information and observations contained in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the United States Government.

This document is not for distribution or reproduction.

DRAFT

Contents

I.	Post-Cold War Opportunity and Challenge	1
A.	Today's Parameters	1
B.	Fundamental Principles in Preventing Conflict	1
C.	A Package to Facilitate Conflict Prevention	1
D.	Issues Addressed in this Guide	1
E.	Who Should Read This Guide?	2
F.	Using This Guide: A Road Map	2
II.	Understanding Conflicts and Peace	3
A.	Costs of Violent Conflict	3
B.	Key Concepts in Conflict Prevention and Mitigation	4
C.	Levels of Conflict and Peace	4
D.	The Continuum from Harmony to War	5
E.	Determinants of Violent Conflict or Peace	7
F.	The Life Cycle of Conflicts: Emergence and Cessation of Violence	10
III.	A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace	11
A.	The Continuum of Interventions	11
B.	Policy Tools for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation	13
1.	Policy Tools and Functional Areas	13
2.	Policy Tools by Principal Source of Conflict Addressed	14
IV.	Developing Effective Conflict Prevention Strategies	17
A.	A Systematic Approach	17
1.	Track National Transitions	17
2.	Set Strategic Goals	18
3.	Analyze Existing Programs and Available Resources	19
4.	Identify Implementors	19
5.	Choose Policy Tools to Achieve Results	20
6.	Time Interventions Carefully	35
7.	Coordinate Responses	35
8.	Divide Labor and Negotiate Responsibilities	36
9.	Define Disengagement	36
B.	Institutionalizing a System for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation	37

3

I. Post-Cold War Opportunity and Challenge

A. Today's Parameters

Political and economic trends since the end of the Cold War offer an opportunity for international collaboration to resolve ongoing violent conflicts and prevent new ones. Long-standing conflicts are diminishing. Relations among major centers of power are less antagonistic. Governments are willing to work together through the United Nations and other multilateral channels, and war is losing favor as an instrument of national policy. The contest between global ideologies is almost completely over; market-oriented economics, freer trade, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are accepted in most countries. Current trends in technology and globalization have brought worldwide improvements in communication. Competition is increasing as national economies open up and protectionist policies are dismantled. These changes all bring a cost of heightened vulnerability and possible destabilization, creating the potential for new cleavages and conflicts.

B. Fundamental Principles in Preventing Conflict

The analysis and recommendations in this *Abridged Practitioners' Guide* rest on four critical premises:

- Effectively preventing the eruption of new violent conflicts and immunizing countries against future conflicts require appropriate policy tools.
- These policy tools should be applied in effective combinations.
- Combinations of policy tools should be proactive, aiming both for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- These tools should be implemented through coordinated country and regional strategies tailored specifically to the conditions and capacities in the area of conflict.

C. A Package to Facilitate Conflict Prevention

This *Abridged Guide* is one component of a three-part tool kit to assist in responding to conflicts.

- A full version of this document entitled *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners* offers readers greater depth of analysis.
- A World Wide Web site at <http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai> offers an interactive point-and-click means to analyze conflicts and prepare responses.

D. Issues Addressed in this Guide

This *Abridged Guide* follows a holistic approach to devising and implementing conflict prevention and resolution strategies with emphasis on the Greater Horn of Africa. Our approach links analysis of the dynamics of conflict escalation and extinction with assessment of policy options, and results into a framework to assist policy-makers in defining, choosing and implementing conflict prevention options.

- How can we predict when a country or sub-region might erupt into conflict?
- Are there strategic entry points into emerging conflicts?
- What approaches can be taken to intervene before conflicts become major crises?

- What interventions are most effective at different stages of conflicts?
- What might be long, medium and short-term approaches to conflict prevention and mitigation?
- How can international programs pursuing other goals be attuned to averting conflicts?
- How can third parties avoid harming and help to empower indigenous institutions in conflict prevention?
- Who should take responsibility for early warning and conflict prevention?
- How could an ongoing conflict prevention capability be structured?

E. Who Should Read This Guide?

This *Abridged Guide* is intended for field and headquarters-based policy-makers and practitioners at all levels, including practitioners engaged in traditional conflict prevention and mitigation activities—diplomats, military personnel—and experts bringing conflict prevention and mitigation to areas such as economic development as shown in the following examples.

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Level: <i>Local</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Project staff in the field □ NGO staff |
| <i>Country</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Ambassadors □ Heads of Missions □ Managers of NGOs |
| <i>Regional</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Policy-makers/project implementors in multilateral organizations □ Development practitioners and policy-makers |
| <i>Headquarters</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Policy planners □ Program administrators □ Development planners □ Regional and country desk officers |

F. Using This Guide: A Road Map

For ease of readership, this *Abridged Guide* is structured into four sections.

- I. *Post-Cold War Opportunity and Challenge*** introduces challenges in conflict mitigation paradigms, strategies and programs.
- II. *Understanding Conflicts and Peace*** discusses the manifestations and sources of violent and peaceful conflicts.
- III. *A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace*** summarizes an array of policy interventions to prevent or mitigate conflict.
- IV. *Developing Conflict Prevention Strategies*** offers guidelines about the goals, tasks and issues in planning and implementing conflict prevention strategies.

II. Understanding Conflicts and Peace

A. Costs of Violent Conflict

Violent conflict has not declined around the world despite the end of the Cold War. From 1989 to 1993, ninety armed conflicts occurred; some 50 violent conflicts take place each year. Few post-Cold War conflicts erupted *between* states; the vast majority arose *within* nations over ethnic, governance, ideological or other national issues. At the same time, all the world's regions have unsettled border and natural resource disputes. Inter-state wars and related phenomena—nuclear arms proliferation, state-sponsored terrorism—could increasingly destabilize international relations in the future.

Africa has experienced an especially large number of recent conflicts and complex emergencies which combine internal conflicts, fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions, large-scale population displacements, and widespread famine, malnutrition or other human deprivations.

- Liberation wars have been replaced by struggles for material survival, with groups competing for control of the state and resources as manifested in warlordism, ethnically-based factional struggles, fundamentalist movements, resource wars, and failed states.
- Overall, from 1989 through 1993, Africa was second only to Asia in the average number of small and large armed conflicts active in each year, averaging 15. This figure does not include instances of repression or massacres of civilians, as in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.
- In 1995, 26 countries were affected by complex emergencies; 12 were in Africa.
- Twelve of the 18 "great domestic slaughters" between 1955 and 1994 were in sub-Saharan Africa. Eight of these were in the Greater Horn (in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi).

Today, actual and potential conflicts are rife in the Greater Horn.

- The longstanding war in the Sudan shows no sign of resolution.
- While international intervention in Somalia saved many people from starvation, opposing factions still fight for control of the country.
- In Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, years of civil war or internal turmoil are over, but because peace came through military victory, resentments fester and national reconciliation to avoid future conflicts is problematic. Reconstruction is particularly difficult in environmentally devastated Eritrea.
- In Rwanda, ethnic distrust weakens institutions in their struggle to maintain basic order.
- Burundi is moving into crisis despite efforts to avoid the horrors experienced by its neighbor.
- Kenya and Tanzania face serious tensions over unresolved political and ethnic issues, though both have avoided major civil conflicts in recent decades.

Violent conflict incurs far-reaching costs that include:

- The human toll when families cannot meet basic needs, with particular consequences for children.
- Impacts on communities as war destroys social fabrics and coping mechanisms.
- Effects on national economies as resource bases are devastated and reoriented from productive to military requirements.
- Repercussions within national political institutions when traditional institutions and power relations are altered.

- Threats to regional stability and security if national political disputes spill over into neighboring countries.
- Humanitarian and reconstruction aid costs incurred to rebuild war-torn societies.
- The price tag for peacekeeping now reaching unprecedented levels.
- Lost opportunities for development, commerce and investment as scarce funding is siphoned off into emergency relief.

To these costs should be added the impacts on US foreign policy, domestic political fall-out, and effects on international cooperation as foreign policy goals are thwarted and prospects for international order are dimmed.

B. Key Concepts in Conflict Prevention and Mitigation

This *Abridged Guide* builds on the following concepts.

- Conflict and peace are not random. Both are created, and both can be influenced.
- Conflict and peace are not static. They are dynamic, related processes that occur over time.
- Not all conflict is violent; some conflicts are settled peacefully.
- Preventing violent conflicts requires understanding the dynamics of conflict, the ingredients of peace, and the particular conflict's causes.
- Effective conflict prevention and mitigation requires different policies, programs and techniques depending on the type and stage of the particular conflict.
- Conflicts can be analyzed and policy options selected according to a theoretical framework to prevent or mitigate conflict.

To understand conflict and peace, this analysis will:

- Distinguish the nature and ingredients of violent conflict as compared to peace, including gradations in these differing states.
- Discuss the structural, proximate and immediate causes of conflict.
- Examine the life cycle of a typical conflict, with gradations from peace to initial conflict to war, then back to peace.

C. Levels of Conflict and Peace

Situations do not fall into simple categories of war and peace, where peace is the opposite of war. Instead, there are *degrees* of conflict: whatever the issues, weapons, parties and geographic scale, a conflict can be assessed according to the intensity of hostility as measured by the conflicting parties' attitudes and behaviors.

Conflict happens when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action which damages other parties to pursue those interests. Conflicting parties can be individuals, groups, or countries.

Latent conflicts are conflicts of interest that are unacknowledged because of self-delusion, rationalization, lack of knowledge, or suppressed information. Conflicts become **manifest** when these unacknowledged contrary interests are conscious and voiced.

Interests can diverge in many ways:

- **Resources**—territory, money, energy sources, food, and their distribution.
- **Power**—the allocation of control and participation in political decision-making.
- **Identity**—treating people with respect and dignity; respecting traditions and social position.
- **Values**—particularly as embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology.

Changes in circumstances can be **objective**—a lowered standard of living, industrial changes that alter technologies and relative power—or **subjective**—newly felt social resentments, a rising nationalist ideology.

Peaceful conflicts are settled according to regulated mechanisms to pursue competing interests. These mechanisms can be local, national or international, traditional or modern, informal or institutionalized: national constitutions and laws, the Law of the Sea, court systems, Robert's Rules of Order, religious codes, habits of debate and discourse, even elections.

Violent conflicts arise when parties go beyond seeking to attain their goals peacefully, and try to dominate or destroy the opposing parties' ability to pursue their own interests. Violent conflicts are distinguished by different dimensions:


- The main **substantive issues** at stake—natural resource competition, government control, territorial control, governing ideologies.
- The **parties** involved—ethnic, religious or regional communities, states, political factions.
- The types of **force** or coercion used—nuclear war, conventional war, terrorism, coups, repression, genocide, gross human rights violations, ethnic cleansing.
- The geographic **scope** of killing and destruction—international conflicts, inter-communal conflicts, state-sponsored terrorism.

D. The Continuum from Harmony to War

The different levels of conflict run along a continuum from highly cooperative to highly conflicted relations—from total harmony of interests to all-out war. There is overlap between peace and war, reflected in terms such as “hot war,” “cold war,” “co-existence,” “rivalry,” “détente,” “alliance,” “special relationship,” and “confederation.”

Figure 1 below illustrates this continuum from harmony to all-out war: the gradations represent a barometer of peace and conflict.

**FIGURE 1: THE CONTINUUM FROM HARMONY TO WAR —
A BAROMETER OF PEACE AND CONFLICT**



Harmony describes a relationship between communities and nations in which there are virtually no conflicts of interests or values, for instance, the feeling of bonding and unity that group members feel when they share a common purpose.

Durable peace, “lasting,” “positive” or “just peace” involves a high level of cooperation at the same time as awareness and pursuit of conflicting interests. Parties value their relationship more than achieving specific self-interests. Peaceful, institutionalized dispute settlement prevails; parties feel no need for military force to safeguard security against others. Cooperative, regulated conflict depends on shared values and goals, accommodating political institutions, outlets for political expression and access to decision-making. Economic interdependence, common culture, and common values may also come into play. Violent conflict or repression are virtually impossible. Examples are US/Canada relations or reunified Germany.

Stable peace or “cold peace” is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation within a context of basic order, mutual respect and absence of violence. Value or goal differences remain, and nations may compete in various ways such as economically (“trade wars”), but competition follows accepted rules and disputes are generally worked out in non-violent, predictable ways. Violent

conflicts are possible but unlikely. Examples are US/Soviet détente in the late 1960s, US/China in 1995 and domestic illustrations such as South Africa (1994-1995) or Nicaragua (1991-1994).

Unstable peace or “cold war” involves palpable tension and suspicion among parties, possibly with sporadic, overt violence. A “negative peace” prevails: there is little physical violence but no friendship. The parties do not value their relationship enough to guarantee not to use violence to achieve goals. Peace is tenuous; levels of tension rise and fall, and parties maintain armed forces as deterrents. The India-Pakistan relationship is an example of unstable peace.

When one party is much weaker than the other, order and absence of violence derive largely from the powerful party's suppression of the weaker party's efforts to assert or achieve its interests. There is some probability of crisis or war. Government repression of groups is a domestic variety of this type of conflict, as in Burma. Some analysts refer to states of peace with political and economic injustice but no physical violence as “structural violence.”

Crisis involves tense confrontation between mobilized armed forces. These forces may engage in threats and occasional skirmishes without exerting significant amounts of force—as in the US/Soviet relationship in the late 1950s. The probability of war is high—as in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In national contexts, civil war or a general breakdown of law and order are imminent—Peru, Colombia.

War is all-out, sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may include low-intensity local conflict such as gang wars, national anarchy—Somalia, Algeria—or “hot” civil and inter-state wars—World War II, Vietnam, Sudan.

In actual situations, these different levels of conflict shade gradually from one to another. Conflicts rarely arise unexpectedly, shift quickly from one status to another, or end suddenly. Relations go through intermediate states in moving from total peace to all-out war.

Various factors underlie each gradation.

- The intensity and number of grievances.
- Parties' awareness of their differences and perceptions and attitudes towards each other.
- The level of emotion and psychological investment in the parties' positions and views of the world.
- The amount of direct interaction and communication the parties have with one another.
- The level of political mobilization and organization behind the parties' positions.
- Cohesion between the respective parties' leaders and constituencies.
- The amount of hostile behavior.
- The extent that parties use or threaten to use arms.
- The number of parties supporting each side.

Analyzing a conflict's position within these gradations is a first step towards determining ways to keep it from worsening.

E. Determinants of Violent Conflict or Peace

Different factors cause conflict. Determinants of conflict can be *systemic* (structural), *proximate* (enabling), or *immediate* (triggering). These factors can be internal or external to the area in conflict.

1. Systemic Causes of Conflict

Systemic or structural causes of conflict cause objective changes in peoples' material and cultural circumstances. Systemic sources of conflict are pervasive and affect large numbers of people; they are less easy to alter through deliberate actions like government or international interventions. Their influence on overt violent conflict operates slowly: systemic factors affect the chances of violence but do not in themselves cause violence. Environmental deterioration, population growth, resource scarcity and competition, the colonial or Cold War legacy, breakdowns of values and traditions, poverty, the marginalization of pastoralists, and ethnicity are all examples of systemic causes of conflict.

2. Proximate Causes of Conflict: Political and Institutional Factors


Proximate or enabling causes of conflict are problems in the social, political and communications processes and institutions that mediate between systemic factors and peoples' lives. Proximate factors are crucial influences on whether systemic conditions give rise to violent conflict. The linkage between proximate determinants and manifestations of violent conflict are easy to discern and their effect is more direct. Government policies, dysfunctional states, economic reform programs, the problems of political liberalization, militarization and external military aid can all be proximate causes of conflict.

3. Immediate Triggers: Acts and Events

Violent conflict is generally triggered by specific actions and events, for instance, a government crackdown on an oppressed group causing a rebellion. Immediate factors are typically visible, possibly relatively easier to influence.

These types of causes overlap and interrelate in conflicts. Figure 2 on the following page illustrates these interrelationships.

**FIGURE 2:
SOURCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT**




12

F. The Life Cycle of Conflicts: Emergence and Cessation of Violence

Conflicts change over time; hostilities emerge, grow and abate. Figure 3 below depicts the stages—beginning, middle and end—and levels of a dispute that becomes violent.

- The horizontal axis represents the stages of the conflict over time, distinguishing between early, middle and late phases.
- The vertical axis measures the levels of the conflict, meaning the degrees of cooperation or hostility between the parties in conflict.
- The arcing line across the diagram portrays the life history of the conflict as hostilities rise and fall in intensity.



The smooth bell curve in Figure 3 simplifies conflict; as illustrated by the arrows that deviate from the line, conflicts exhibit different trajectories, thresholds, jumps or discontinuities, and conflicts that have ceased can re-ignite. Nonetheless, most violent conflicts exhibit periods of initial growth, full-blown antagonism, and abatement from high points of hostility.

Conflicts can escalate from peace to war both vertically and horizontally.

- With *vertical* escalation, hostile behavior becomes more intense.
- With *horizontal* escalation, hostile behavior spreads to a larger area.

Figure 3 suggests where conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa currently fall. While observers may disagree about the precise level and stage of particular conflicts, differentiation according to a conflict's level and stage is useful in selecting policy interventions.

III. A Toolbox to Respond to Conflicts and Build Peace

A. The Continuum of Interventions


Conflicts arise from multiple causes and run through various stages of escalation or de-escalation. Interventions can be undertaken at any point in the conflict-peace continuum and can be performed by third parties or by the parties involved in the dispute. Effective response to violent conflict requires matching appropriate tools to the circumstances and devising and implementing multi-tooled, place-specific strategies.

We propose the following definitions to match interventions to the phases of conflict.

<i>Conflict prevention</i> (preventive diplomacy, preventive action, crisis prevention, preventive deployment)	Actions, policies or procedures undertaken in vulnerable places and times to keep states or groups from threatening or using armed force and related forms of coercion to settle disputes. Conflict prevention also means actions taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence.
<i>Crisis management</i>	Efforts to keep situations of high tension and confrontation, usually involving threats of force and its deployment, from breaking into armed violence.
<i>Conflict management</i> (conflict mitigation; peacemaking)	Efforts to contain and reduce the amount of violence used by parties in violent conflict and to engage them in a process to settle the dispute and terminate the violence.
<i>Peace enforcement</i> (sometimes called peacemaking)	The use of armed force by a third party to deter, suppress or terminate hostile action by a party or parties, such as under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
<i>Conflict termination</i>	The cessation of armed hostilities between parties.
<i>Peacekeeping</i>	Efforts to maintain a cessation of armed hostilities or ceasefire reached by parties to a violent conflict by separating their armed forces.
<i>Conflict resolution</i> (post-conflict peacebuilding)	Efforts to increase cooperation among parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship by addressing the conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive attitudes and allaying mistrust through reconciliation initiatives, and building or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact. Conflict resolution can be used to reduce the chances of violence or to consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict to prevent re-escalation.

Figure 4 on the following page matches these categories of intervention to the life cycle of a conflict.

**FIGURE 4:
THE LIFE CYCLE OF A CONFLICT
WITH PHASES OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION**



The figure shows a typical conflict progressing along the intensity curve alongside interventions as defined above.

- Peacetime diplomacy or politics are suitable interventions for parties in a state of durable peace.
- Conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy are appropriate tools if tensions rise to a point of confrontation.
- Crisis management becomes necessary when a dispute reaches the crisis point, with outbreaks of violence.
- Conflict management or peacemaking are required in times of war.
- As the conflict subsides to a ceasefire, peace enforcement becomes appropriate.
- Interventions in conflict termination are required until the dispute is settled.
- As conflicting parties begin rapprochement, peacekeeping interventions can be helpful.

- Conflict resolution or post-conflict peacebuilding apply in the final stages of a conflict as parties move towards reconciliation.

Note that conflict prevention takes place at times of unstable peace: conflict prevention occupies the position between regular peacetime diplomacy—national and sub-national politics that operate during stable and durable peace—and those interventions calculated to minimize or manage crisis and war. Interventions in conflict management or mitigation, on the other hand, are required in the high-violence period of war.

B. Policy Tools for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation

A wide array of techniques, methods and programs can be used to prevent and mitigate conflict. Policy tools are generic modes or strategies to address a conflict's overall effects. Policy tools can comprise several projects, procedures, programs, policies or mechanisms and may require more than one implementing organization.

Policy tools differ in the source of conflict they address, the functional area of intervention, actors and resources required, strengths and weaknesses as revealed in their historical use, and in a timeframe to see results. The World Wide Web Page and this *Abridged Guide's* companion document *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners* review in depth the policy tools that are summarized below.

1. Policy Tools and Functional Areas

Tools aimed at conflict prevention and mitigation can operate through different functional areas. Table 1 classifies 94 policy tools according to whether they qualify as official diplomacy, non-official conflict management, military measures, economic and social development, judicial and legal measures, communications and education, or political development and governance.

TABLE 1: POLICY TOOLS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION**◆ Official Diplomacy**

Mediation; negotiations; conciliation; good offices; informal consultations; peace conferences; unilateral good will gestures; special envoys; conflict prevention or management centers; diplomatic sanctions; international appeal/condemnation; crisis and war diplomacy; coercive diplomacy; diplomatic recognition; withdrawal of recognition; certification/decertification; hot lines.

◆ Non-Official Conflict Management Methods

Mediation; support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions; peace commissions; non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops; civilian peace monitors; conflict resolution or prevention centers; visits by eminent organizations/individuals/"embarrassing witnesses;" "friends" groups; non-violent campaigns; cultural exchanges; civilian fact-finding missions; humanitarian diplomacy.

◆ Military Measures

Preemptive peacekeeping forces; restructuring or integration of military forces; professionalization or reform of armed forces; demobilization and reintegration of armed forces; military-to-military programs; alternative defense strategies; confidence-building and security measures; non-aggression agreements; collective security or cooperation arrangements; deterrence; demilitarized zones; arms embargoes or blockades; threat or projection of force; limited military intervention; disarmament; arms control agreements; military aid; crisis management procedures; arms proliferation control; peace enforcement.

◆ Economic and Social Measures

Development assistance; economic reforms; economic and resource cooperation; inter-communal trade; joint projects; private economic investment; health assistance; agricultural programs; aid conditionality; economic sanctions; humanitarian assistance; repatriation or resettlement of refugees and displaced people.

◆ Political Development and Governance Measures

Political party building; political institution-building; election reform, support and monitoring; national conferences; civic society development; training of public officials; power-sharing arrangements; decentralization of power; trusteeship; protectorates; human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building; constitutional commissions.

◆ Judicial and Legal Measures

Commissions of inquiry/war crimes tribunals; constitutional commissions; judicial/legal reforms; police reform; support to indigenous legal institutions; arbitration; adjudication.

◆ Communications and Education Measures

Peace radio/TV; media professionalization; journalist training; international broadcasts; promotion of alternative information and communication sources; civic education; formal education projects; peace education; exchange visits; training in conflict management/resolution/prevention.

2. Policy Tools by Principal Source of Conflict Addressed

Table 2 classifies these policy tools according to whether they address systemic, proximate or immediate causes of conflict.

**TABLE 2: TOOLS FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION
BY PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CONFLICT ADDRESSED**

◆ Tools Addressing Systemic (Structural) Causes

Main Aim and Target: To increase the aggregate, conserve and/or redistribute natural, economic and human resources—land, water, food, infrastructure, technical skills—in order to improve material conditions.

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Targeted development assistance such as road-building | <input type="checkbox"/> Human resource development programs such as job training |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Economic reforms, including possible social safety nets | <input type="checkbox"/> Public/private health assistance such as sanitation facilities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Economic integration/cooperation | <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural productivity promotion programs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inter-communal trade | <input type="checkbox"/> Humanitarian aid |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private economic investment in conflict-prone areas | <input type="checkbox"/> Resource management/cooperation |

◆ Tools Addressing Proximate (Enabling) Causes

Main Aim and Target: To create or strengthen general political, social and economic institutions, rules, procedures, and other decision processes through which societies define their public problem agenda, set goals, form policies, allocate authority, implement public decisions, and settle grievances.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Constitutional commissions/reforms | <input type="checkbox"/> Training public officials |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Judicial/legal reforms | <input type="checkbox"/> Civic society development |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Support to local indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions | <input type="checkbox"/> Political and economic conditionality |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Human rights promotion, institution-building and monitoring | <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict prevention centers |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Election reform, monitoring and support | <input type="checkbox"/> Power-sharing arrangements |
| <input type="checkbox"/> National conferences | <input type="checkbox"/> Decentralization of power |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Political institution-building | |

◆ Tools Addressing Proximate (Enabling) Causes (Continued)

Main Aim and Target: To reduce and put prior restraints on specific means of coercion that could be used to carry out violent conflicts.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Coercive diplomacy/economic and diplomatic sanctions | <input type="checkbox"/> Arms embargoes |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Human rights monitoring | <input type="checkbox"/> Surgical power projection/threat of force |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International condemnation | <input type="checkbox"/> Disarmament |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Police reform | <input type="checkbox"/> Arms control agreements |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Restructuring/integration of military forces | <input type="checkbox"/> Arms proliferation controls |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Demobilization/reintegration/reduction of military forces | <input type="checkbox"/> Military aid |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Military professionalization/reform | <input type="checkbox"/> Alternative defense strategies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Non-aggression agreements | <input type="checkbox"/> Preventive peacekeeping forces |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Security agreements | <input type="checkbox"/> Targeted deterrence policies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Demilitarized zones/peace zones/nuclear-free zones | <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent war crimes tribunals |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Trusteeships, protectorates | |

◆ Tools Addressing Immediate (Triggering) Causes

Main Aim and Target: To regulate parties' conflict behavior—actions, speech and interactions.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Special envoys | <input type="checkbox"/> Support to indigenous conflict management/resolution mechanisms |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mediation | <input type="checkbox"/> Crisis management procedures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Negotiation | <input type="checkbox"/> Peacekeeping forces |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Arbitration | <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict management and resolution training |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conciliation | <input type="checkbox"/> Peace commissions/committees |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Good offices | <input type="checkbox"/> Peace conferences |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adjudication | <input type="checkbox"/> Reciprocated good will gestures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Civilian fact-finding missions | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conditionality | <input type="checkbox"/> Peace monitors |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Humanitarian diplomacy | <input type="checkbox"/> Internationally sponsored peace consultations |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sanctions | <input type="checkbox"/> Conflict resolution/prevention centers |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Arms blockades | <input type="checkbox"/> Visits by eminent organizations/individuals/ "embarrassing witnesses" |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International moral appeals/condemnation | <input type="checkbox"/> Threat or use of force |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Informal consultations | <input type="checkbox"/> Limited military intervention |

IV. Developing Effective Conflict Prevention Strategies

A. A Systematic Approach

Effective conflict prevention strategies require policy interventions based on the conflict's stage and causes, primary objectives and timeframes for action, and implementation strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We offer a nine-step approach to devising a coherent conflict prevention and mitigation strategy.

1. **Track national transitions.** Conflict prevention and mitigation are not generic. Effective peacebuilding requires a clear understanding of the sources and nature of particular conflicts in order to end or prevent them.
2. **Set goals.** Policy-makers must determine priorities in conflict prevention or mitigation in light of the country's situation and the nature of the conflicts.
3. **Assess available resources.** Policy-makers should build on suitable existing programs and resources to achieve specified goals.
4. **Identify actors.** Policy-makers must determine which internal and external actors might best achieve the established goals in light of each implementor's strengths and weaknesses.
5. **Choose tools.** Policy-makers must select policy options, assessing what indigenous and outside efforts might best achieve the selected goals and where new initiatives must fill gaps.
6. **Time interventions.** Policy options vary according to the stage of conflict; some must be carefully sequenced to achieve their intended effect. Early interventions can save costs in the long run.
7. **Coordinate responses.** Coordinating regional and international responses maximizes results while minimizing chances of different intervenors' goals contributing to the conflict.
8. **Divide labor and negotiate responsibilities.** Explicitly spelling out actors' responsibilities and mandates in achieving conflict prevention goals is an important step in maximizing scarce resources.
9. **Plan the exit strategy.** Third parties must define criteria for disengagement.

1. Track National Transitions

Anticipating and responding to incipient violent conflicts begins by evaluating a country's status on the road to durable peace or its slide toward violence. This means assessing a nation's progress in the ingredients of durable peace: material prosperity through economic growth, a participatory political system, an active and responsible civic society, human rights, social equity, a sustainable natural environment, and effective, legitimate government institutions. These elements may not occur simultaneously; a nation may be progressive in economic policies while retrograde in popular participation in government. Countries may exhibit uneven internal development, with some regions advancing faster than others. Answers to the following questions help analysts situate a country on the spectrum between durable peace and all-out war.

- Economically, how prosperous is the country? Is it endowed with human, capital and natural resources on which it can draw to increase the population's well-being? Does it have competitive, market-governed processes to produce and distribute basic commodities, land and labor services?
- Socially, how widely distributed are ownership of resources and the ability to control the means to produce remunerative benefits from them? Are the society's various economic, ethnic, religious,

regional and other groups organized into active associations or other institutions that protect and advance their interests?

- Politically, how democratic is the regime? Is it pre-democratic, democratizing, consolidating democracy, or an institutionalized democracy? Has the ability to establish political parties and field candidates been institutionalized? Are there civic associations and social institutions that are independent of the regime? How many successful democratic multi-party elections has it had?
- Governmentally, does the political regime embody representation and collaboration among diverse social forces or is the government dominated by one party or social group?

2. Set Strategic Goals

Rapid movement towards durable peace cannot be achieved without strain. Violent conflicts can arise when gross disparities appear in progress towards different goals or when the nation's capacity to adjust is overtaxed. Analyzing the country or region's status in the spectrum from peace to war allows strategists to pinpoint the issues, areas and sectors calling for priority attention and where resources should be concentrated. The strategy's immediate goal is to move the country along the spectrum to the next, more desirable stage of conflict or peace. Objectives should be linked to overall movement towards durable peace, with indicators established for measuring progress in each area.

Goals will typically be to reduce negative factors and enhance positive conditions; the appropriate combination will depend on the nature, stage and cause of conflicts.

- When the potential for conflict is real but remote in time, strategies should focus on addressing long-term systemic causes of violence.
- When states are at war, strategies should emphasize disarming combating parties and meeting affected populations' material needs.

Goals in moving towards are not always compatible.

- Goals in conflict prevention include anticipating and heading off immediate problems like mass violence, arming of militias, or suppression of minorities. Peacebuilding also means promoting respect for human rights, democratic processes, economic growth, and environmental protection. These goals are sometimes fully compatible, sometimes overlap, and occasionally, are competing and incompatible.
- Policy-makers should be aware of the ways that violence prevention can compromise other worthy goals such as progressive political change. Policy-makers should face these trade-offs forthrightly when formulating locale-specific strategies and adopt appropriate balancing and modulating tactics.
- The first obligation in intervening is to avoid exacerbating tensions that could break out in violent conflicts. The international community should be aware that militant promotion or enforcement of democracy and human rights against non-democratic regimes or in fragile liberalizing societies can cause an increase in violence which then might require costly international remedial efforts.
- No single goal can be universally applied as an end in itself, be it states' territorial integrity or peoples' full self-determination. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding require that area-specific prevention of violence be balanced against promoting peaceful socio-economic and political transformation.

This is not a rationale for the entrenched to hold onto power without legitimacy or accountability. Oppressive policies and gross economic and political inequalities should not be infinitely tolerated for the sake of preserving order. Feasibility, prudence, sustainability and orderly transition are important elements in an effective strategy.

3. Analyze Existing Programs and Available Resources

Conflict prevention strategies should consider building on existing resources and initiatives where these can support conflict prevention goals.

- ***Existing conflict prevention programs*** should be inventoried and evaluated so that appropriate programs can be supported. Analysts should examine the following issues for each program.
 - Is the program realistic in view of the conflict?
 - Does the program target explicit conflict prevention or mitigation goals?
 - Does programming incorporate conflict prevention components?
 - What is the program's impact on the distribution of benefits among actual or potentially conflicting parties? Is the program likely to worsen or ameliorate group socio-economic disparities?
 - What is the capacity to handle the social and other changes the program will cause? Can these changes be handled non-violently?
 - Does the program's implementation process foster reconciliation or does it widen divisions?
 - Is the program timed to reduce tensions? Does the timing—implementation and results—dovetail with the course of conflict identified during the initial conflict analysis phase?
 - To what extent can anti-conflict efforts be integrated into the program?

This program-by-program analysis can be summarized in a matrix to allow policy-makers a global perspective on existing programs and their capacity to support or hinder conflict prevention efforts.

- ***Local and regional resiliency*** should be assessed for indigenous capacity to handle the conflict. This means determining what local, national and regional capacities, resources and political will can be leveraged to keep tensions from intensifying. Local resources can be more efficient and cost-effective than third party interventions.

4. Identify Implementors

Responsibilities should be assigned among the local, national, regional and international players who will implement the conflict prevention strategy. These assignments should reflect these actors' willingness and capacity to perform conflict prevention and mitigation tasks to achieve the stated goals.

The choice of implementors can affect the conflict's course. Governmental and non-governmental actors should be carefully considered in light of the conflict's scale and nature. Involvement by high-level officials (the US Secretary of State) or bodies (the UN Security Council) may be counterproductive in suppressing low-level conflicts: these presences can raise the stakes and increase incentives for conflicting parties to grandstand instead of resolving their dispute.

The United Nations is the single organized body that includes virtually all countries and that already carries out various functions in conflict management and peacekeeping. The UN's worldwide organizational network brings access to ancillary programs and expertise and can easily focus the international community's moral pressure on conflicting parties. Its strength lies in addressing disputes among states. Yet the UN is overloaded, with limited policy tools and cumbersome approval processes. By raising a conflict to world visibility, the UN can inadvertently widen a conflict, causing parties to become more combative and encouraging others to take sides.

Regional organizations such as the OSCE, OAS and OAU have early detection and preventive response capacities; these capabilities are under development in sub-regional organizations like IGAD and ECCAS. Their geographical proximity facilitates their role in early warning; consensus for action is easier than with the UN, and their interventions may reflect regional cultures, customs and norms. Yet some regional organizations have historically been ineffective; they are not always impartial, and they may offer comparatively little professional experience in conflict prevention and mitigation.

Non-governmental organizations active in humanitarian affairs, conflict resolution and democracy-building bring extensive grassroots contacts and intimate knowledge of the area in conflict. At the same time, NGOs are usually short of resources, financially dependent on their donors, and may not carry the financial or military clout or staying power of larger multinational entities.

Third party states may have direct interests in another state's stability and can often respond more quickly than international organizations. Yet states can act to preserve their strategic, economic or other interests in ways that may not correspond to the international community's broader interests.

5. Choose Policy Tools to Achieve Results

The policy-maker's next step is to select policy intervention tools that will accomplish the conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy's goals. The choice of policy tools should be governed by certain principles.

- Circumstances demanding conflict prevention and mitigation generally require a combination of tools contributed by a range of actors and applying positive and negative pressures.
- Effectiveness lies in finding the right mix of tools to meet the objectives laid out in the conflict prevention strategy.
- The choice of policy intervention tools should be made from the "ground up"—it should be based on analysis and tailored to the specific conflict rather than invoking familiar remedies because these are convenient or available or because practitioners are experienced in their implementation.
- Policy-makers and practitioners should resist the urge to "do something" in the face of conflict without ascertaining that their intervention is appropriate to the specific context and constitutes the best possible response.

a) Match Tasks and Tools

Tools vary according to cost, expected outcome, timeframe for results, and effectiveness at various stages of conflict. Table 3 below illustrates ways to match tools, tasks and the conflict's characteristics.

TABLE 3: ILLUSTRATIVE TOOLS TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS ACCORDING TO CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS

No restraints on violence—inadequate limitations on parties' ability to resort to armed force to achieve demands.

Tasks: Suppress or contain violence or the threat of violence; deprive parties of arms; provide protection against the use of arms.

Tools: Preventive peacekeeping force; targeted deterrence; enforceable demilitarized zones; safe havens; emergency measures; protectorates; war crimes tribunals; arms embargoes; military assistance; disarmament measures.

Lack of a process—no procedures or institutions through which to discuss the dispute and seek solutions.

Tasks: Engage parties in communication and dialogue; create channels and processes for discussion and negotiation; set up or strengthen permanent political institutions.

Tools: Good offices; mediation; peace conferences; arbitration; adjudication; political institution-building; problem-solving workshops; democracy-building; trusteeship; peace commissions; confidence-building and security measures; support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal mechanisms.

Lack of resources—parties have no material means to engage in efforts to keep the dispute from worsening.

Tasks: Meet elemental needs; alleviate extreme social and economic conditions.

Tools: Humanitarian relief; technical assistance; economic assistance.

Lack of solutions—parties are at the table, seem willing, but lack proposals for settling the issue.

Tasks: Address particular disputes; consider a variety of policy options; generate a range of possible settlements.

Tools: "Friends" groups; non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops; power-sharing arrangements; decentralization of power.

Lack of incentives—solutions abound but the parties lack sufficient motivation to accept any of them.

Tasks: Induce parties to adopt solutions.

Tools: Positive inducements (persuasion; security guarantees; aid); negative inducements (aid conditionality; coercive diplomacy; economic sanctions; threats of force; diplomatic sanctions).

Lack of trust—parties' negative attitudes mean they can't move beyond feelings to consider or comply with solutions.


Tasks: Provide mutual assurance; change attitudes and perceptions; reduce tensions as they arise.

Tools: Non-official facilitation; communications and education measures.

b) Match Tools to the Stage of Conflict

Table 4 is a matrix to help policy-makers tailor their choice of interventions to the stages of peace and conflict. For each stage of peace and conflict the table defines the overall environment, timeframe for action, and primary objectives. We then enumerate a range of policy tools that could be applied to that stage of conflict; these tools are organized functionally for ease of reference. Figure 5 below illustrates these categories of analysis and the organization of Table 4.

Figure 5: Organizing the Analysis of Policy Tools by Stage of Conflict



**TABLE 4-1: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 1: STABLE PEACE**

Stage of Conflict	Stable peace (prior to eventual conflict)	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Relationships of basically open communication and limited cooperation within context of order.• Value or goal differences exist but are mainly addressed through established, non-violent channels.• Possible minor political protests or violence against property and national symbols.• Chances of violence low to remote.	
Timeframe for Action	Long term.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Create and strengthen channels for dispute resolution.• Shape/change masses’ and elites’ attitudes, perceptions and skills that affect their grievances and actions.• Maintain and strengthen stable relations and institutions.• Create, strengthen or reform domestic political, social and economic institutions, procedures and other decision processes that define the public problem agenda, goals and policies, allocate authority, implement public decisions, and settle grievances.• Define norms.• Reduce socio-economic sources of conflict.• Improve national and global welfare.• Strengthen international and regional organizational capacities.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Stable Peace		
Official diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Regional economic and resource cooperation• Informal diplomatic consultations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Arbitration by International Court of Justice
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cultural exchanges• “Friends” groups	
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Disarmament• Arms control agreements• Military reform/professionalization• Military force restructuring/integration• Military-to-military programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Security agreements/cooperation• Non-aggression agreements• Demilitarized zones, peace zones, nuclear-free zones• Alternative defense strategies
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic reforms• Private economic investment and loans• Local/regional/international economic and resource cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Development assistance• Joint projects• Health assistance• Human rights monitoring/promotion

Illustrative Policy Tools: Stable Peace Prior to Conflict (Continued)

Judicial and legal measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support for indigenous conflict management mechanisms• Arbitration
Communications and education	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace education• Civic education• Conflict resolution education/training• Formal education programs• Media professionalization• Journalist training• International broadcasts

**TABLE 4-2: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 2: UNSTABLE PEACE**

Stage of Conflict	Political tensions	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Low-level political conflict over particular issues.• Diffuse political instability.• Inequitable socio-economic structures.• Whole communal groups or regions marginalized.• Socio-economic and regional differences politicized.• Uncertainty.• Inadequate political structures and processes.• Poor responsiveness by government.• Low degree of governmental legitimacy.• Near crisis.• Violence possible.	
Timeframe for Action	Medium term.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Address disputes.• Engage parties in dialogue; channel grievances into negotiations.• Foster positive communication.• Strengthen political and civic institutions.• Discourage extreme actions that can precipitate violence.• Head off crises.• Reduce tensions.• Improve leadership relationships.• Alleviate worst conditions breeding conflict.• Provide humanitarian resources to minimize additional stress and tension.• Enhance cross-cutting social and economic ties.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Unstable Peace		
Official diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Informal consultations• International moral appeals/condemnation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conciliation• Good offices• Special envoys
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Visits by eminent organizations/individuals/"embarrassing witnesses"• Support for local conflict management/resolution mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Civilian fact-finding missions/observers/monitoring/verification teams• Mediation
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Military confidence-building and security measures• Preventive peacekeeping forces• Military-to-military programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• General deterrence policies• Military restructuring/integration• Military professionalization/reform
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic reforms, including social safety nets• Development assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic and resource cooperation• Conditionality• Inter-communal trade

Illustrative Policy Tools: Unstable Peace (Continued)		
Judicial and legal measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Judicial/legal reforms• Arbitration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Police reform
Communications and education	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace radio/TV	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Media professionalization

**TABLE 4-3: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 3: CRISIS**

Stage of Conflict	Incipient violence	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Distrust.• Anomie.• Social/political differences polarized.• Taking up of arms.• Threats, provocative acts, sporadic, unorganized, low-level violent acts.• Interests perceived as incompatible; mistrust; inter-group hostility.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Repression, insurgency, systematic violation of human rights.• Perceived legitimacy of national government in widespread decline.• National mobilization.• High intensity of conflict.• Violence actual or imminent.
Timeframe for Action	Short-term.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reduce/put restraints on specific means of coercion that can be used to carry out violent conflict.• Block violent acts.• Reduce tensions.• Contain crisis.• Freeze hostilities.• Maintain basic security.• Defuse political conflicts.• Resolve political disputes.• Create non-violent means for addressing issues in conflict.• Limit arms.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Crisis		
Official diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Special envoys• Coercive diplomacy• Hot lines• Good offices	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mediation• Negotiations• Conciliation• Diplomatic sanctions
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support for local conflict management/resolution mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace commissions• Visits by eminent persons
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Confidence-building and security measures• Crisis management procedures• Military reform/professionalization• Military restructuring/integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Arms embargoes and blockades• Power projection/threat of force• Limited military intervention• Deterrence

Illustrative Policy Tools: Crisis (Continued)		
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conditionality• Inter-communal trade• Economic reforms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic sanctions• Development assistance• Economic and resource cooperation
Political development and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Political institution-building• Election support and monitoring• Human rights promotion/monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Power-sharing arrangements• Decentralization of power

**TABLE 4-4: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 4: WAR**

Stage of Conflict	Violent conflict	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Breakdown of civic society.• Disintegration of central government.• Rule of law abolished or threatened by military or emergency rule.• Population displacements, refugee flows.• Humanitarian crises.• Devastated infrastructure (communications, transport).• Deteriorating health situation; decreasing life expectancy.• Shortage of basic goods.• Distorted war economies.• Growing dependence on food imports and other humanitarian supplies.• Active, ongoing, sustained warfare among organized groups and government forces.	
Timeframe for Action	Immediate.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Stop violent or coercive behavior.• Separate powers.• Arrange and enforce ceasefires.• Meet basic material needs.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: War		
Official diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Diplomatic sanctions• Mediation• Negotiations• Peace negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace conferences• Special envoys• Conflict prevention/management centers
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace commissions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support for local conflict management/resolution centers
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Military assistance• Threat/projection/use of force• Limited military intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace enforcement• Arms embargoes• Arms blockades
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Humanitarian aid• Economic reforms• Sanctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conditionality• Resettlement/provide shelter/resources for displaced persons/refugees
Political development and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Political institution-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Training of public officials

**TABLE 4-5: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 5: POST-CONFLICT CRISIS**

Stage of Conflict	Cessation of hostilities; settlement	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Widespread casualties.Mutual stalemate.Declining political support for armies.Physical and institutional infrastructure destroyed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Lack of social services.Bitterness; distrust.Political polarization.Social instability.Political transition.
Timeframe for Action	Immediate to long-term.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Regulate parties' conflict behavior, actions, speech, interactions.Enforce ceasefires.Contain crises.Conduct economic reform and reconstruction.Perform political reform and rehabilitation.Reform security sector.Rehabilitate social service sector and institutions.Prevent further conflict and disintegration.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Post-Conflict Crisis		
Official diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">MediationNegotiationsPeace conferences	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Peace consultationsReciprocal conciliatory good will gestures
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Peace commissions
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Military demobilization/reintegrationMilitary restructuring/integrationConfidence and security-building measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Military reform/professionalizationArms controlDisarmamentDemilitarized zones
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Reconstruction assistanceEconomic reformsPrivate investment and loansInter-communal tradeDevelopment assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ConditionalitySanctionsRepatriation/resettlement of refugees and displaced people
Political development and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Political institution-buildingElection support and monitoringNational conferencesDecentralization of power	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Power-sharing arrangementsCivic society developmentLocal government capacity-buildingCapacity-building of public officials

Illustrative Policy Tools: Post-Conflict Crisis (Continued)		
Judicial and legal measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Human rights monitoring/promotion• Judicial/legal reform• Police reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• War crimes tribunals/commissions of inquiry
Communications and education	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace radio/TV	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Media professionalization

**TABLE 4-6: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 6: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION**

Stage of Conflict	Unstable peace	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Political transition.• Changing roles and expectations.• Bureaucratic inertia.• Increasingly violent crime; organized crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Political politicization.• Financial problems.• Breakdown of social mores and institutions.• Widespread economic devastation.
Timeframe for Action	Short to long term.	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Political reform and rehabilitation.• Transform the security environment/create an atmosphere of basic security.• Redefine and reorient relationships between political authority and citizens.• Reconstruct infrastructure.• Redefine relationships among ethnic and social groups.• Rebuilt/reform society, polity and economy.• Promote accountability and security to inhibit cycles of revenge killing.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Post-Conflict Reconstruction		
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Peace monitors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conflict resolution/prevention centers
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Confidence-building and security measures• Peacekeeping• Military professionalization/reform• Military restructuring/integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Military demobilization/reintegration/armed force reduction• Disarmament/demining• Arms control
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Development/reconstruction assistance• Conditionality• Sanctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Joint projects• Economic and resource cooperation• Repatriation/projects with displaced people/refugees
Political development and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Constitutional reform/commissions• National conferences• Political institution-building• Election support and monitoring• Political party-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Human rights promotion and support• Decentralization of power• Partitioning• Training of public officials• Civic society development
Judicial and legal measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Adjudication• Judicial/legal reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Arbitration

**TABLE 4-7: STAGES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE
WITH CORRESPONDING POLICY TOOLS
SITUATION 7: RECONCILIATION**

Stage of Conflict	Stable peace	
Environment for Interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Renewal of communication, political legitimacy, cooperation among groups.• Value or goal differences exist, addressed mainly through established, non-violent channels.• Chances of violence low to remote.	
Timeframe for Action	Medium to long term	
Primary Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Create and strengthen channels for dispute resolution.• Maintain and strengthen stable relations and institutions.• Create, strengthen or reform domestic political, social and economic institutions, procedures and other decision processes that define the public problem agenda, goals and policies, allocate authority, implement public decisions, and settle grievances.• Reduce socio-economic sources of conflict.• Improve national and regional welfare.• Strengthen international and regional organizational capacities.	
Illustrative Policy Tools: Reconciliation		
Non-official conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cultural exchanges• “Friends” groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Non-official facilitation/ problem-solving workshops
Military measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Disarmament• Arms control agreements• Military reform/professionalization• Military force restructuring/integration• Military-to-military programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Security agreements/cooperation• Non-aggression agreements• Demilitarized zones, peace zones, nuclear-free zones• Alternative defense strategies
Economic and social development	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Development assistance• Economic reforms• Private economic investment and loans• Regional and international economic and resource cooperation• Regional trade agreements• Joint projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inter-group cooperative projects• Conflict resolution education/training• Employment training• Infrastructural development projects• Agricultural productivity promotion projects• Health assistance

Illustrative Policy Tools: Reconciliation (Continued)		
Political development and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political institution-building • Civic society development • Civic education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human rights monitoring and support • Training public officials • Constitutional commissions/reforms
Judicial and legal measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbitration • Judicial/legal reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Court of Justice
Communications and education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace education • Civic education • Conflict resolution education/training • Formal education programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media professionalization • Journalist training • International broadcasts

6. Time Interventions Carefully

Early intervention is critical to prevent conflicts; policy tools are available to prevent conflicts from becoming violent or to keep extinguished conflicts from reigniting. Yet early intervention requires resources, especially political will, and experience shows it can be difficult to mobilize a national or international constituency before a conflict escalates into crisis.

- Policy-makers should intervene as early as possible before a conflict escalates and requires more significant and costly intervention.
- Early intervention might require domestic constituency-building to foster political will for conflict prevention.
- Policy-makers should devise multi-tooled interventions to respond to specific conflict situations and pay attention to sequencing policy tools in a manner that maximizes their impact.

7. Coordinate Responses

Single organizations often develop and implement country strategies. This unilateralism loses effectiveness when policy-makers and practitioners focus on their own programs and objectives, with little regard to how their efforts could support rather than compete with others. The international community can add to conflict when third parties approach potential combatants in partisan ways that exacerbate antagonisms.

- Conflicts usually arise from various sources and offer different points of leverage to bolster peace.
- A single party rarely has the resources to fulfill all the disparate needs.
- Joint approaches that knit together third parties' varied capabilities and the range of tools at their disposal are most likely to be effective in preventing and mitigating conflicts.
- Local, regional and international coordination in conflict prevention and mitigation should be planned, strategic, and integrated into individual conflict prevention programs.
- Coordination must occur at various levels.
 - Countries must coordinate among government ministries.
 - National governments must coordinate with donors.
 - Donors must coordinate among themselves.
 - Sub-regional and regional organizations must coordinate with other players.

The following actions would maximize cooperation among external intervenors.

- Improve coordination within one's own organization or government.
- Enhance coordination, communication, decision-making and chains of command among agencies within a country and regionally.
- Coordinate a rational division of responsibilities among governments and their agencies to avoid manipulation by warring factions over the placement of resources and other unintended consequences of large-scale responses.
- Jointly review and evaluate proposals.

- Consult with host governments.
- Exchange information among agencies and between countries, bilaterally and through regional and sub-regional organizations.
- Set aside political and bureaucratic obstacles.
- Build on existing regional frameworks such as the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

8. Divide Labor and Negotiate Responsibilities

Joint effort does not mean that all agencies should undertake all activities in a given nation or region. All actors in conflict prevention and mitigation bring strengths and weaknesses; some lack the resources to perform certain tasks, while others differ in their perceived legitimacy in the eyes of conflicting parties. These assets and liabilities should be considered in assessing implementing actors and their utility for meeting the specific conflict needs at hand.

- Begin by making coordination explicit among the range of governmental and non-governmental actors to be involved in the conflict prevention or mitigation initiative.
- Follow with detailed individual and organizational responsibilities to achieve the stated results.

Implementing highly delegated, multi-organizational public-private programs and multi-program policy strategies presents characteristic challenges.

- The impetus for policy change may be external.
- Policy changes are often top-down and motivated by a small set of decision-makers.
- Technical professionals formulating policy may be unfamiliar with the political and bureaucratic environment within which the policy is implemented.
- Resources to effectuate policy changes are often unavailable or misallocated.
- Government agencies and procedures responsible for carrying out policy changes can be rigid and not easily adaptable.

Five tasks can be emphasized to achieve results.

- Gain legitimacy for the policy changes.
- Build a constituency.
- Mobilize adequate resources.
- Redesign organizational tasks.
- Monitor the policy changes' implementation and impact.

9. Define Disengagement

A responsible conflict prevention and mitigation strategy will specify how and when the effort should be terminated and how intervenors can limit their commitment to ensure that they can withdraw.

Truly preventive action limits engagement. The point of acting preventively is to avoid extreme intervention through selective and modest early engagement.

The nature of the intervention determines ease of disengagement. Preventive action seeks to shore up local, national and regional mechanisms to resolve disputes in vulnerable areas without replacing indigenous mechanisms. Interventions generally do not risk inextricable involvement when there are indigenous institutions and processes, however shaky. Those risks increase significantly when third parties are required to restore law and order, create political institutions, foster social reconciliation, and assist in economic reconstruction. Disengagement becomes more difficult when third parties have intervened to resolve a violent conflict with military force.

Exit criteria emerge from the indicators and benchmarks associated with the goals and tasks defined during the analysis phase of developing the conflict prevention strategy. This systematic approach allows policy-makers to define their exit strategy.

Exit criteria should be defined and explicit from the outset. Limits and sunset provisions should be placed on potential responsibility and financial costs. Sponsors of conflict prevention should identify and detail local, regional and other parties' mutual obligations and enforce strict *quid pro quo* contractual arrangements with the parties in conflict.

B. Institutionalizing a System for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation

Many of the issues that arise in responding to or anticipating an emerging conflict could be effectively addressed if an international system for conflict prevention and mitigation were developed and institutionalized. Devising such a system would reduce response time, minimize the intervention learning curve and stretch limited resources. An effective institutionalized conflict prevention system might exhibit the following characteristics.

- Proactive interest in and early response to low-level conflicts.
- Resources and attention focused on especially troubled areas.
- Emphasis on peaceful change.
- Coherent local conflict prevention and mitigation strategies.
- Local and sub-regional actors authorized and empowered to act as the first line of prevention.
- A graduated sequence of contingent responses based on conflict's intensity and antagonists' power.
- Higher-level, more coercive responses by major powers and other global actors when necessary.
- Multilateral cooperation and coordination at all levels.
- Public-private partnership between official bodies and NGOs.
- US leadership.

The following guidelines could help to establish such a system.

Unify functional mandates. A range of actors participate in conflict prevention and mitigation, each bringing different strengths, weaknesses, jurisdictions, mandates, funding sources, constituencies, objectives and procedures. Comparative advantages could be better leveraged if intervenors' strategies and programs were deliberately melded.

A set of established procedures might keep disputants from delaying or playing different actors against each other. A coordinated strategy might assist outsiders in gaining a mandate to preempt potential crises before they erupt and provide a way to measure progress in the event of intervention. Pooling available resources

for conflict prevention and mitigation and assigning tasks deliberately would make more conscious and coordinated use of the respective political, moral and material advantages of the third parties involved in conflict prevention around the world.

Reduce top-down policy formulation and overload. The way conflict prevention and other policies are developed in many organizations limits effective early response.

- Most governmental and non-governmental entities—including the UN, the US government, many NGOs and other governments—use a centralized decision-making process which overloads top officials' capacity to deal with the multiple demands competing for their attention.
- Overloaded policy-makers tend to ration their energies and concentrate only on problems that have reached a crisis point, attracted significant public attention, or are advanced by the most persuasive policy entrepreneurs or the most forceful domestic interest groups.
- Short-term pursuits tend to push long- and medium-term concerns off the conflict prevention agenda; even policy planning units established specifically to take a longer view get swallowed up in current operations.

Functional fragmentation and vertically centralized structures lead to stock responses to emerging conflicts as policy-makers recapitulate standard operating procedures to address the situation within their traditional competence.

Develop an integrated multilateral response system. Labor divided vertically and horizontally would give discretion to diplomats and others within the different organizations comprising this conflict prevention system to work together laterally. This means linking conflict prevention organizations loosely in a single system featuring:

- An organizational culture fostering openness, flexibility and cooperation.
- Decentralization with autonomy.
- Shared vision and common goals.
- A strategic planning process to implement established goals.
- Clear allocation of responsibility within an overall approach.
- Transparency in planning and operations.
- Authority based on knowledge rather than position.
- Mature leaders and members.

These arrangements would constitute a set of procedures and understandings among regional and international entities, authorizing member organizations to undertake the chief responsibilities with links to semi-independent NGOs to carry out certain tasks.

Make the local arena the first line of preventive defense. When signals warn of a deepening dispute, the regional and international community should explicitly and vocally reiterate the expectation that disputing parties will seek their own solutions by engaging each other peacefully as early as possible. Third party actions should seek to strengthen—not replace—local political institutions, focussing on pre-conflict peacebuilding. Only when local or national institutions have failed should responsibility for preventive diplomacy shift to sub-regional or regional organizations.

Make the regional arena the second level of prevention. Sub-regional and regional multilateral organizations (RMOs) can play a more active role in strengthening regional inter-state security and in peacefully resolving ethnic and other internal political conflicts within member states. The international community should capitalize on RMO assets by giving them progressively greater authority to engage in local conflict prevention activities, developing commonly accepted rules for RMO initiatives, and providing more financial and logistical support to equip RMOs to perform their new responsibilities.

Some RMOs cannot currently handle disputes. Empowering RMOs can be accomplished in phases, with initial international support of *ad hoc* regional preventive efforts while working over the long term to develop RMO capacity to assume greater preventive responsibilities.

Save global intervention for the last resort. As conflict prevention responsibilities are progressively pushed downwards, global-level actors such as the UN can devote their attention and resources to large-scale crises that local and regional efforts cannot handle (major wars, nuclear threats), to lower-level regional conflicts that third parties have tried but failed to prevent, and to back-up peace enforcement where regional military resources are inadequate.

Use a horizontal process. As each of the vertical levels assumes greater conflict prevention responsibilities, all players should engage in greater lateral cooperation, coordinating actions, pooling resources, and assigning responsibilities according to a conflict's circumstances. An economical approach might be to face a potential conflict by constituting an informal multilateral task force or contact group comprising NGOs, RMOs, the US, the UN, and other relevant players to design and implement the conflict prevention strategy.

Form government-NGO partnerships. NGOs are active in relevant fields such as "track two" diplomacy, conflict resolution training, democracy-building, and refugee and humanitarian work. NGOs' private auspices, transnational contacts and humanitarian goals endow them with special legitimacy; their wide-ranging partnerships—trade unions, professional groups, business associations, universities—and work on the ground often gives them a degree of local access that regional or international actors cannot muster. NGOs can play non-threatening and positive roles in alleviating low-level tensions and pre-violent conflict; the advantages NGOs offer over direct official government involvement warrant further exploration.

Organize under US leadership. A stratified, multilateral conflict prevention system must be championed by an actor of global stature. The US is appropriate for this role in light of its extensive foreign policy network, information-gathering apparatus and membership in regional organizations worldwide. US leadership in conflict prevention can be exercised by:

- Legitimizing and publicizing the strategic sense of early intervention.
- Furnishing resources to multilateral organizations and NGOs on the front lines of conflict prevention.
- Supplying diplomatic muscle, sponsorship and energy to particular preventive efforts.
- Providing experienced diplomats to mediate incipient disputes.
- Welcoming, encouraging and seeking to enhance the international roles of other states and entities.
- Supporting the development of regional conflict prevention capabilities.